

STAMP Incident Investigation: Control Structures as a Tool to Intervene



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- To show you our use of STAMP *during* incident investigation
- To share with you
 - the results so far
 - our recommendations



1. **Who is NEDTRAIN?**
2. **What is NEDTRAIN's 'traditional way' of incident investigation?**
3. **Why did you introduce STAMP?**
4. **How did you apply STAMP?**
5. **Can you show us an example?**
6. **What are the results of using STAMP till now?**
7. **What would you recommend us?**



1. NedTrain & NS

Amsterdam

Onnen
Maastricht
Amsterdam
Leidschendam

4 4 4



nieuwe Intercity



2. NEDTRAIN's incident investigation

Incidents & near misses:

- Railtraffic (shunting),
- Occupational health
- Train safety

Approx. 100 investigations/yr

Proces:

- Interviews
- Data analysis
- Multi Timeline & animation
- Analysis & conclusions
- Check & suggestions; by presenting to all involved
- Measures & management learning; by presenting to management
- New: STAMP analysis to improve last step





3. Reasons for introducing STAMP

- **Nancy's lecture on STAMP in Amsterdam 2014**
- **Desire to include systems thinking in incident investigation**
- **Desire to include mental models in incident investigation**
- **Desire to change thinking of management**
 - they did it wrong → why did it make sense?
 - It's up to the workforce → I have a stake!



- **Little experience in applying STAMP during incident investigation**
 - at NEDTRAIN: none
 - in the Netherlands: limited, mainly Dutch Safety Board
- **No handbook**
- **No training courses**
- **Solution: hands-on coaching by experienced user, just start!**



4. Application of STAMP: STEPS


1. **Consider** the added value of STAMP
2. **Define** the undesired event and relevant hazards
3. **Identify** relevant components in the system
4. **Specify** for each component:
 - Responsibilities relevant for controlling the hazards
 - Control actions (constraints given to other components)
 - Feedback
5. **Evaluate** the control structure
 - Control/feedback: absent, wrong, missing, too late, ineffective?
 - System: how effective is it in controlling the hazards?

**Control
Structure**



5. Example: Train on track available for other train

Near miss caused by SPAD at Heerlen, Netherlands, 29-8-2014, 19:28





Amsterdam Singelgracht, april 21 2012:
1 passenger killed, 190 injured
Right train passed signal at danger



5. Example: Investigation

Focus on understanding:

- What happened?
- How did it happen?
- Why did it make sense?
- Interviews
 - individually
 - based on *MEDA* (Boeing)
 - focus on Human Factors
- Analysis of
 - onboard data recorder
 - traffic control data
 - voice logging

Timeline

august 29

19:11

19:17

19:22

19:27

19:28

37 years of experience, 14 years as shunting driver. Last late shift in row of 5. Fit but a sandwich didn't fall well (several visits to bathroom)

Starts shift at 14:00. No work till 16:00.

Waits for train NSR 6959 at platform 1/2. Train arrives on schedule at 19:11

Train arrives, driver NSR leaves. Driver NedTrain checks if train is empty and gets in. His job: shunt empty train to platform track 205

Gets blinking yellow signal to leave for track 211. Stops 44 meters past signal 100. Changes sides

Drives to signal 100, sees that it shows red

Brakes very late and speed exceeds speedlimit in ATP system which is activated. Driver sees this as a malfunction of ATP

Overrides ATP VV by unconsciously pressing reset button twice within 3 seconds instead of once to reset

Sees blinking white lamps aside service crossing and closing of level crossing

Sees a member of public crossing closed level crossing right in front of him

Starts driving past red signal. Doesn't see it is still red

Sees switch 93 is in the wrong direction and applies emergency brakes

Driver 1 NedTrain

Driver 2 NSR

Friday

Arrives at track 202 to leave for Stolberg (Germany). Planned departure 19:28

Leaves platform and speed is approx 20 km/h

Sees signal 88 turning red and applies emergency brake. Stops in time

Landgraaf Stolberg (Ger)

Platform 4/5 Heerlen

Monday to thursday

Platform 1/2


Late and strong braking is normal for shunting drivers (uncomfortable, but never passengers on board and fastest way of working)

Shunting drivers hardly ever drive in area's covered with ATP. They drive on yards around stations and workshops. ATP VV is relatively new and braking by ATP VV isn't expected.

Use of ATP VV in this manner is unknown by instructor-driver. Especially older drivers and around workshop Maastricht use it this way due to frequently shunting trains with defects

Mgt & organisation

- Not acc. expectation
- Missed signal
- Trigger or contributing factor



Panel in dashboard train cockpit. Train design is of 1960's, ATP added in 1980's, ATP VV added 2010

NedTrain



Human Factors:

- Experience: ATP VV system override common practice
- Confirmation bias: several signals triggering standard script
- Distraction: members of public passing closed barriers

Contributing factors:

- Knowledge of ATP VV
- Friday - different route & timing

Check with other drivers: This could happen to me too!



5. Example: STAMP Steps

1. **Consider** the added value of STAMP
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 - Responsibilities relevant for controlling the hazards
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**Control
Structure**



5. Example: STAMP Steps 1-3

1. **Added value:** to include responsibility at higher levels, systems thinking
2. **Undesired event & relevant hazards:**
 1. Undesired event = collision of two trains
 2. Hazard = train on track, given available for another train
 3. Systems goal = to run multiple trains on infra
3. **Relevant components in the system:**

1. Infrastructure	5. frontline manager
2. Drivers	6. driver -instructor
3. Trains	7. site-manager
4. Systems in the train (train controls, ATP), in the infra	

5. Example: STAMP Step 4 -5

4. Specify for each component:

- Responsibilities: **safe operation within boundaries**
- Control actions: **accelerate, break, switch on/off, etc**
- Feedback: **position, speed, etc**


5. Evaluate the control structure

- Control/feedback
- System


Blunt end



Sharp End



5. Example: STAMP control structure





5. Example: STAMP


Could we see this coming?

This incident was a combination of **Expectations + self-learned optimizations + normal disturbances: *it was all there already***

STAMP

- Explain: how does the system control the hazards that can lead to this type of incident
- Focus: how does the system control and monitor the drivers behaviours, expectations, self-learned patterns?
- Approach: dialogue with upper-management-levels on their roles

5. Example: STAMP control structure








5. Example: Bottom line

Conclusion:

Management won't learn: will not see erosion & dangerous patterns



Future incidents will not be prevented



Not aware that managers are not aware of how things work in real world and accuse in stead of creating a climate to be open and learn

Not aware of these phenomena. Accusing the actions of the driver: we told you to stop for red signals!

Interpretation ATP VV
Incomplete script



6. Results so far

Based on application in 10 cases

- **Management**

- not aware of patterns and “work as done”
- eyeopener! > more involved in incident investigation
- starts to accept local rationality of people at sharp end
- awareness of their own role grows
- awareness that the **red line (control)** is leading and **the blue line (sense)** is under developed
- starts to detect patterns and risks in their own processes

- **Notions:**

- Incident investigation itself is a form of sensing.....
- STAMP triggers thinking towards “*illusion of control structure*”




6. Recommendations

1. Use **STAMP** *during* your investigation when you are ready to exceed incident level
2. Use **STAMP's** control structure for a dialogue with higher level controllers:
 - Did you know it worked this way on operational level?
 - What is your role and responsibility in this?
 - What information do you receive on how it works?
 - How do you steer on adequate performance?
3. **Focus on one level lower (not only the operational level)**
 - The role of a manager is to detect whether one level lower is detecting....
4. Use colors and animations to build up the model



Learning from incidents

- **Level 1: taking measures on operator level:**
 - more instruction on ATP VV,
 - using this case in toolboxmeetings with operators to point at patterns
- **Level 2: enhancing the controlstructure to detect patterns and optimization of workmethods on forehand**
 - Investigate current control structure, supported bij STAMP
 - Discussions with management where and how to improve detection (and see limitations)..... *under construction at this moment!*
- **Level 3: being aware that our view on safety has to change**
 - Use cases like this on all levels to change from accusing and “find the culprit!” to “why did it make sense to do what they did?”
 - This is the basic requirement to start learning in stead of just managing measures



*Thank you for
your attention*

Questions?